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supply and price are felt within the
first year through production changes.
Some are felt the second year through
carryover impacts.
In terms of implementing such pro
grams, producer participation of 100
percent in any acreage set-aside pro
gram is improbable. Therefore, a 15
percent reduction of production in the
current 15 percent set-aside program
for wheat is not expected. If we get 50
percent final participation in a 15 per
cent wheat set-aside, we could poten
tially expect 7.5 percent less produc
tion if it weren't for the fact that
non-participants often tend to increase
production and that participants tend
to set-aside their poorest land and
farm their remaining acres more inten
sively. As a result, supply is likely
to be reduced, but realistically, we
might expect the reduction to represent
about 3 to 5 percent of expected produc
tion without a set-aside. For compari
son, last year's U.S. production of
wheat, corn, and soybeans increased 18,-
23, and 13 percent respectively over
the previous year. Therefore, acreage
set-aside programs may only have limit
ed potential for moderating supply and
demand imbalances.
Programs designed solely to influ
ence'"storage—such as farmer-owned re
serve and Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC) operations—characteristically
possess both short-run and longer term
consequences. Commodities that are
taken off the market and placed on re
serve provide a floor under prices to
prevent further declines. However,
these reserves return as ceilings which
prevent market prices from increasing
as the reserves are released back on
the market. At the end of this year,
only 35 percent of the 1 billion bushel
plus wheat carryover is expected to be
in free reserves that are not included
in CCC or farmer-owned reserve pro
grams. This is down from 50 percent
free reserves in 1980 and 44 percent
Higher interest rates, abundant
crops this past year, and lower farm
prices have led many people to suggest
that this coming crop year may repre
sent the crossroads for many South
Dakota farmers and agribusinesses.
Given the importance of agriculture in
the South Dakota economy, many people
have recently become interested in
studying the farm policy options for
grains with the hope of finding a bet
ter solution to current problems. This
newsletter reviews the alternative
supply management options that can be
used to influence market conditions.
What are the Supply Management Tools?
It is a basic economic principle
that for producers to receive higher
prices for their products either market
supply or demand must be altered. Here,
we take a look only at the supply side.
'MaTfket "suppTy l-S defined as the amount
of a commodity that producers and
storers are willing and able to sell on
the market for a given price. In turn,
production and storage determine how
much is available to sell on the market
at any given time. Therefore, supply
can be managed by managing (1) how much
is produced, (2) how much is put in
storage, and (3) who has access to the
market.
Programs designed to influence
production—such as paid acreage diver
sions or deficiency payments and acre
age set-asides—directly alter current
production levels and market supply in
the short-run. Most of the impacts on
free reserves in 1981. As a result, we
can expect much of the now increasing
government stocks to be released back
onto the market when and if the reserve
release prices previously specified are
reached in the market or when the
three-year farmer-owned reserve con
tracts expire and if extensions in the
contracts are hot granted.
Larger storage programs are more
expensive and will increase storage
costs either to producers or to the
U.S. Government. Assuming 15 percent
interest on operating capital for the
producer, the opportunity interest cost
for storing $4.00 wheat would be 50 per
bushel per month. Therefore, annual
storage costs would be 600 per bushel.
_E.oj: S-t-orage—to—be—profitable- at.- these
rates, the market price would have to
be 600 higher a year from now, or 300
higher 6 months from now, unless part
of the storage cost is paid by govern
ment outlays.
The consequences of restricting
market access depend upon how far in
advance the restricted access is known.
If access is known in advance of pro
duction decisions—as in a market order
system—producers have flexibility to
adjust production. However, storage
costs may still increase, because of
unintended production in excess of the
quota. The excess must either be
stored, dumped, or channelled to an al
ternative use.
If market access is not known in
advance of production decisions—as in
a holding action __or embargo—storage.
dumping, or alternative uses must pick
up all of the slack because production
reduction adjustments may be impossible
until the next year. Holding actions
and embargoes are likely to increase
the market price in the external market
for the short-run, but tend to depress
price when the holding action or embar
go ends. Producers in the external
market, , who are not participating in
the holding action, receive the higher
short-run prices resulting from the
holding action, and they do not share
in the storage costs for holding the
commodity off the market. On the other
hand, those participating in the
holding action would partially forego
the higher short-term prices as they
face higher storage costs for holding
their grain off the market.
What are the Policy Options?
Throughout the history of farm,
and food policy, we have discovered
three ways to manage supply: (1) free
markets, (2) voluntary controls, and
(3) mandatory controls. Voluntary and
mandatory controls could possibly be im
posed either by government agencies or
by producer organizations. The con
cepts and consequences of each are dis
cussed in turn.
Free markets simply mean that mar
ket prices guide production, storage,
and marketing decisions without non-com
petitive intervention from consumer,
producer or government sources. With
respee-t -to—=-agr icul-tu-r-a-l eommod-i-t-ie-s-r-
history shows that free markets result
in some periods of extremely high
prices and some periods of extremely
low prices. High prices result in
fence-row to fence-row production, in
creased farm income, and increased
entry of resources into agriculture in
cluding young farmers. Low prices re
sult in shifts to alternative enter
prises, reduced income, and increased
exit of resources from farming includ
ing those who are unable to weather the
storm. Under this option, individual
farmers are in control of their own
production, storage, and marketing de
cisions. Price depends upon the collec
tive response of producers. As a re
sult, farmers reap rewards and failures
based upon their skill in coping with
their production and marketing environ
ment and "luck" of circumstances beyond
their control.
Voluntary supply management pro
grams establish market intervention
mechanisms that provide incentives for
producers to voluntarily alter produc
tion patterns and/or storage levels.
Under this approach, the probabilities
of either extremely high prices or ex
tremely low prices are reduced. How
ever, there is no clear cut prediction
for the average price level over time.
Average prices could be either higher
or lower than the free market average
prices depending upon the political ob
jectives involved, the farmer response
to programs and the underlying market
conditions. In this case, the rewards
received by farmers depend not only on
individual skill and "luck" but also on
the politics of food and agriculture.
Mandatory controls establish mark
et dominance mechanisms that require
centralized control over market supply.
If the objective of mandatory control
is to raise average price, then market
supply must decline relative to demand.
Therefore at a minimum,' individual auth
ority in making production and market
ing decisions must be transferred to a
cartel—either a government agency or a
producer organization that has ability
to control supply. At present, the
control is in the hands of thousands of
farmers, grain traders, and their credi
tors. For a cartel to work, these indi
viduals must give up some of their in
dependence in production, storage, and
marketing decisions to a central de
cision-making cartel.
Secondly, the success or failure
of mandatory control depends upon the
size of the market share controlled.
Smaller cartels have smaller potential
impacts on price. Competitors in the
external market are likely to pick up
part of the slack in supply as they
respond to increasing prices resulting
from the cartel holding action. Also,
potential buyers tend to flock to the
lowest prices available which are like
ly to be in the external market. There
fore, the cartel becomes the residual
supplier of the commodity. For the
cartel to survive, it must be able to
control a large enough market share so
that the price increase is sufficient
to offset any profit loss due to added
storage costs imposed on cartel members
or due to reduced volume of sales. In
the final analysis, the rewards receiv
ed by the cartel producer will depend
on the 'politics of the cartel manage
ment decision process.
Where does South Dakota fit in?
Wheat, corn, and soybeans are our big
gest cash crops—in that order—and ac
count for about 70 percent of South
Dakota cash receipts in grains. South
Dakota in turn, accounts for about 3
percent of U.S. wheat, about 2 percent
of U.S. corn, and about 1 percent of
U.S. soybean production. In terms of
world production, U.S. production ac
counts for about 15 percent of world
wheat, 27 percent of world course
grains, and about 60 percent of soybean
production in the world. This means
that South Dakota represents about one
half of one percent of world production
in each of these crops.
Sizable proportions of our farm
commodities are used domestically, but
the remainder enters world trade chan
nels. International conditions, there
fore, heavily influence our commodity
prices. The U.S. exports 64 percent of
our wheat production, about 35 percent
of course grain production, and 40 per
cent of soybean production. In terms
of total internationally traded commodi
ties, U.S. exports account for 42 per
cent of world wheat traded, 60 percent
of world course grains traded, and 78
percent of soybeans internationally
traded. Therefore, South Dakota ex
ports represent about 1 percent of the
portion of these commodities that move
through international markets.
In the case of wheat, for ex
ample, certainly a cartel representing
South Dakota alone would not have a
significant effect on price. A cartel
representing 40 percent of U.S. wheat
production would account for about 17
percent of wheat traded on the interna
tional markets. Even the U.S. as a
cartel would only represent 42 percent
of the world market. For comparison,
OPEC has controlled about 50 percent of
world oil production and about 75 per
cent of oil trade. Moreover, OPEC re
cently has not been entirely effective
at setting the price of oil.
A wheat cartel made up of the
U.S., Canada, Australia, Argentina, and
the European Community would account
for 96 percent of the international
wheat markets. However, divergence in
foreign and domestic policy objectives
of these various countries can cause
problems in the cartel decision-making
process.
Finally, the consequences of all
of the supply management options depend
in part on the ability of foreign and
domestic consumers to adjust to changes
in supply. Consumers adjust in re
sponse to changes in price and in the
reliability of the supplier. If prices
are high enough or supplies uncertain
enough—regardless of whether the fluc
tuation in supply and price are due to
free markets, voluntary controls, or
mandatory controls—consumers will tend
to conserve and/or shift to substitute
goods. For example, some customers like
China are willing to interchange the
classes of wheat and/or shift to rice
at the "right" price. Last year, China
was our largest foreign wheat customer.
Who Ought to Pay For the Programs?
Should producers and consumers
pay for controls initially or should
taxpayers? If a producer organization
is in control, either individual pro
ducers must be previously assessed to
cover the financing of the management
tools or penalties must be imposed on
producers to insure compliance. Eventu
ally, the costs of managing supply are
partially paid by consumers through the
market place. Thus, a producer organiza
tion could represent a narrow set of
producer interests, but producers would
initially bear the full cost of imple
menting the management tools.
From agriculture's perspective, a
trade-off exists between government fi
nancing and government control. Since
agriculture is a minority in Washing
ton, management tools are not designed
solely for farmer interests, but are
designed with consumer, foreign policy,
and budget interests in view. The re
vised "Golden Rule" appropriately de
scribes this situation in that "those
with the gold usually rule". With gov
ernment controls, agriculture simply
doesn't control all of the "gold".
Concluding Perspective
There is no market or supply man
agement mechanism that will solve the
problems of all producers and con
sumers. After all, the market is only
a system of exchange. In South
Dakota, commercial producers who repre
sent 36 percent "of Census farms account
for 78 percent of products sold in the
state. Some of these commercial pro
ducers are able to survive the toughest
times because they may have saved
enough emergency funds for bad years,
they may possess sufficient equity in
their operation, or they may run highly
efficient operations. Other commercial
producers may be young and highly lever
aged. These highly leveraged producers
are experiencing cash flow problems re
gardless of their production efficiency
because interest is an added expense of
conducting their business.
Due to lack of volume, other pro-
- duee-r^s are- -unable to generate—what many~=
people would call an adequate income
level from farm sources, even during
good times. The supply management stra
tegies will not alleviate this low in
come problem of these low volume,•full-
time farmers, because all three of the
market options discussed distribute re
wards according to volume of production.
In the final analysis, the supply
management policy decisions will be ham
mered out through the political pro
cess. The outcome will depend upon agri
culture's ability to prioritize its pro
blems and to agree on which management
tools and policy options ought to be
used to solve them.
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